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WHEN TO USE COLLABORATION, BARGAINING AND POWER APPROACHES
Conflicts are normal and the natural consequences of human
interaction in an organizational setting. They can occur for a
myriad of overt or hidden reasons. For example, an individual
interacting with others on a project is upset because he feels a
colleague is getting preferential treatment in relationship to
himself: the internal stress he experiences causes him to subvert
the normal work process, trying to gain the preferential treatment
for himself, thereby setting up "conflict-problems" within the
organization.
Harmony within an organization can also be destroyed by
external pressures and crises that breed disagreement and tensions,
causing disruptive conflicts within the enterprise. For example,
in such an external crisis situation, those in position of authority
can become so involved with the "life- and- death" issues and tasks
of survival that they neglect to give attention to the needs of those
around them. They, in turn, build up an eroding feeling of resentment
and ill-will.
This article is about Conflict Management. It is aimed at
conflict managers (CMs) faced with the responsibility of resolving
the internal or external conflict problems confronting their own
organizations that are judged to be harmful to the system and whose
deletorious impact requires remedial intervention. The first step
is the formulation of a Contingency Theory for managing the particular
conflicts eroding the enterprises in order for the CM to have a
conceptual framework for knowing what action to take and when.
CONTINGENCY THEORY
In order to understand the framework in which the Contingency
Theory operates, it is necessary to define the methods normally
applied to the understanding and handling of conflicts:
(1) Conflict Studies: A non-dynamic approach where
the scholar seeks only to
understand
(2) Conflict Resolution: An attempt to solve the
problem once and for all
(3) Conflict Management: A dynamic, ongoing approach
where a CM recognizes problems
and acts to use the energy they
generate to improve the organi-
zation
The Conflict Manager accepts conflicts as normal and natural
events and is prepared not only to take the necessary action to
resolve the disputes , but to harness the energy generated by these
conflicts. By such action he will improve the organization as well
as the individuals.
The causes of conflicts are innumerable and managing them is
a complex process calling for a variety of interrelated and integrated
approaches. Thus, a conflict management theory contingent upon the
situation is required.
Organizational theorists in the early and mid- I960' s focused
on the impact of tasks and the external environment on the enterprise.
3.
Their work emphasized that there is no "best" way to design the
organization's structure, "since appropriate structure is contingent
upon the variations in both task and environment, as well as the
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needs of individuals and groups within the organization." These
studies have led to a body of literature called Contingency Theory.
As Thomas and Bennis put it,
"An effective paradigm incorporates what might
be termed a 'situational' or 'contingency' frame-
work, a point of view reflected in much of the
current theoretical and empirical work in organi-
zational theory. There is a primary emphasis
upon diagnosis and the assumption that it is
self-defeating to adopt a 'universally' applicable
set of principles and guidelines for effecting
change or managing conflict "3
Accordingly, it is proposed herein that the appropriate conflict
management mode is contingent upon a diagnosis of the causes and
the existence of certain preconditions, from which a Contingency
Theory of Conflict Management is established.
There are three major Conflict Management approaches from
which a manager can draw to formulate a Contingency Theory appropriate
to the problems and disputes disrupting an organization: Collaboration.
Bargaining and Power-play. While none of these is appropriate for
every situation, neither is any one used without consequence. One
strategy might be best for organizational improvement, while another
(albeit appropriate) may cause the most problems for the enterprise.
The objective is to be guided by a normative theory of organizational
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effectiveness and to use it whenever possible; however, where the
diagnosis of the problems reveals that the normative position will
not "cure" them, the Conflict Manager should design a Contingency
Theory strategy somewhere between the idealistic (normative) and
realistic (one of the three Conflict Management approaches)
.
If the organization in which the various units and people
are conflicting has a healthy mix of tasks , environmental conditions
,
internal structures and procedures, human and other resources, the
Conflict Manager might opt for a mixed strategy between two or more
of the management approaches to solve the dilemma.
THREE CONFLICT MANAGEMENT MODES: PREFERENTIAL CONTINGENCIES
Collaborative : This theory maintains that people should
surface their differences (get them out in the open) and then work
on the problems until they have attained mutually satisfactory
solutions. This approach assumes that people will be motivated
to expend the time and energy for such problem-solving activity.
It tries to exploit the possible mutual gains of the parties in
the dispute and views the conflict as a creative force pushing
them to achieve an improved state of affairs to which both sides
are fully committed.
Bargaining : This mode for managing conflicts assumes that
neither party will emerge satisfied from the confrontation but
that both, through negotiation, can get something they do not have
at the start, or more of something they need, usually by giving up
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something of lesser importance. One party generally wins more than
the other; by the skillful use of tactical trades, he can get the
maximum possible from the other side. Sometimes the tactics used
in trading are underhanded and create bad feelings. In the end,
when an agreement is reached, it is usually enforced by a written
contract with sanctions in case of non-compliance. In the event no
agreement is reached, a third-party mediator may be employed to
bind the sides to eventual arbitration.
Power-play : This mode differs from the other two approaches
because its emphasis is on self-interest. Whereas, in collaboration
and bargaining the two sides come together to try and resolve their
problems, when power is the dominant mode, the actions are unilateral
or in coalitions acting unilaterally. All of the power technician's
resources are unleashed against his opponent to win on a given issue
or a long-range program. He gives neither internal commitment nor
does he agree to external sanctions guaranteeing compliance to joint
decisions.
Collaboration is the most preferred strategy for the good of
the enterprise because: (1) it promotes authentic interpersonal
relations; (2) it is a creative force for innovation and improvement;
(3) it enhances feedback and information flow, and (4) it has a way
of ameliorating the climate of the organization so that there is
4
more openness, trust, risk-taking and good feelings of integrity.
Bargaining is the second most preferred alternative. It is an
approach that, at the least, bring the parties together and it can
lead to binding them together to joint decisions. It gets the sub-
stantive issues out on the table where they can be better understood
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and acted upon. It allows for interaction on the problem.
Power play is the least desirable method for organizational
effectiveness (although it may be the most desirable approach for
an individual who has the potential for winning). Generally, aggressive
and hostile feelings exist between those locked in a power struggle,
shutting off communication and interaction. Vicious gossip may ensue,
causing rumors and otherwise distorting information. All of this tends
to drive information underground so that the organization and the
parties involved cannot learn from their experience since there is little
honest feedback. A large amount of sabotage and non-compliance takes
place which harms the system. People acting in their own self-interest
often subvert the organization.
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE THREE MODES
COLLABORATION :
The collaborative approach commonly used in organization develop-
ment (OD) , is a fairly carefully defined theory and method for managing
conflict. The CM first causes each side to expose its problems and
disagreements with the other side and to exchange information openly
and willingly; ideally, the adversaries then interact until they arrive
at mutually satisfactory and creative options which allow them to achieve
workable solutions. Sometimes the process stagnates because the parties
involved are too close to the issues to perceive alternate approaches, or
because they may be too protective of underlying restraining forces to
permit full exposure of the issues. The CM can then bring in or act as a third
-
party facilitator to help clarify the problem, sharpen the issues, find
commonalities, use greater skill, synchronize time and space, summarize,
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restructure and make the process more constructive, diagnose the
restraining forces in a more objective way and, generally, give needed
support. He is, however, merely a facilitator, and does not participate
in making the decision or even become too involved in the substance
of the problem.
The energy derived from conflict orientations and feelings is
viewed as creative tension which then provides excess energy for
problem solving and innovative improvement. In order for constructive
confrontation to occur, a supportive organizational climate (e.g. trust)
must exist; furthermore, the parties involved must be skillful and proficient
at problem solving activities or they must use the skills of a third-
party facilitator.
POWER :
Except in authoritarian situations where employers rule by
command, power strategists are covert, their tactics undefined in
direct contrast to collaborationists or bargainers whose openness and
definition of problems are the principal ingredients of resolution.
People who play power games do so instinctively, using information
strategically and revealing as little as possible to the opponent.
Consequently, not much is known about the theoretical framework for
using power. Obvious power tactics that could enhance the power-
tactician's position in the organization are: manipulating and hoarding
scarce information; systematically engaging in acts of sabotage and
non-compliance; forming and joining coalitions to serve a purpose;
becoming withdrawn or autonomous in order to resist the influence of
others; creating conditions of uncertainty for others and certainty
8.
for himself; giving out and collecting on favors; co-opting; using
force or threats of force. The basic idea of the power player is to
act in his own self-interest, to bias other people's perceptions of
his potential power and to gain favorable outcomes for himself, usually
at the expense of others.
However, we know little about how these strategems are best
employed, nor the consequences, the outcomes, the ground rules and the
limits of the approach. Power strategies are difficult to research
because they are so secretive and are observable mainly in the form
of results instead of processes. What we do know is that power tactics
are extremely self-interest oriented and information is used most
strategically and unilaterally. Power tactics are qualitatively
different from bargaining, and diametrically different from collaboration
in both of these dimensions.
The Third- Party authority person (or group) plays the ultimate
role. When conflict management or power-players fail to resolve conflicts
in a manner satisfactory to the organization's best interests, the
authority-person steps in and takes over. He is the ultimate protector
of the organization's interests and as such, establishes the optimal
limits of the organizational tolerance for power struggles. Rather than
helping people or groups in conflict to work through their differences,
the authority person dictates the solutions. Generally, his method is
direct and incisive: he dismisses people from the organization, legis-
lates new rules, restructures the hierarchy and makes judgments about
the merits of the case. Finally, he elicits external commitments ("do
it or else") from the parties in dispute.
9.
BARGAINING :
As an approach to conflict management, this bargaining method contains
elements analogous to both collaboration and power. It resembles
the collaborative process because it is a systematic theory and
method which, in some of its forms, allows for collaboration between
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negotiators. It can certainly lead to collaboration once power
parity and trust have been established. Bargaining also achieves a
common solution which, while it might lack the strong internal commit-
ment of the disputants, is at least conciliatory and congruent with
some overall organizational purposes.
Commitments reached are often guaranteed by legalistic sanctions
.
Yet, the difference between bargained resolutions and power-won
resolutions is that the legal sanctions arrived at through bargaining
derive from a process whereby the disputants themselves agree to the
resolutions and are irrevocably committed to them. In power play, those
in conflict tend to push the rules as far as they can, their sole limit
the endangerment of their jobs. They have little or no commitment to
anything except their fear of losing.
The use of the third party mediator in the bargaining mode is
different from his facilitator counterpart (used in the collaboration
mode) because he has the power of decision. However, it must be
pointed out that during arbitration of a bargaining session, the
conscientious mediator will engage in the same conciliatory procedures
as the facilitator, i.e. helping and encouraging the parties to arrive
at mutually acceptable solutions. He will leave aside his mandatory
authority and his more active initiatives until and unless the two sides
prove irreconcilable.
10,
There is a facet to bargaining that is similar to power strategies:
the parties are encouraged to represent their self-interest. However,
unlike those who use the power approach, the bargainers make these
interests known by putting them on the bargaining agenda. Also, they
are prepared to compromise these interests to improve their long-range
position and for the overall good of the organization. Information is
used strategically as well, but eventually is shared (although it may
not always be truthful or accurate) so that there will be a basis for
negotiation. The opposing parties divulge what they want and what they
are prepared to relinquish in order to get it. They prioritize their
demands
.
In other words, in pure power-play, the end justifies the means.
But this tactic in bargaining is mitigated by the fact that a long-term
relationship is being developed. Thus, the parties consciously try to
arrive at equitable resolutions which "down- the- line" will not engender
renewed dissatisfaction and ill-will on either side. Even when they
do not achieve full measure of that for which they are bargaining, the
parties assume that they will meet again to negotiate further. The next
time around, they are often prepared to "give" on a substantive issue in
order to assure a more effective process (or a debt of reciprocity) on
an ongoing basis. On the other hand, power strategists take all they
can and give as little as possible at any time.
Thus, at either extreme, are the collaborative and power approaches
to conflict. The gap between them is great. Collaboration is benevolent
and systematic; power is survival -oriented and intuitive. Where the former
is optimistic, the latter is often a reactive back-up position which has
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as its purpose to coexist with conflicts rather than to attempt to
manage them. Bargaining, therefore, can be viewed as a theoretical
"connecting bridge" between the most salutary (collaboration) and the
most destructive (power) uses of conflict -energy. Only when the
power tactician's forces have been neutralized to the point of a
standoff between him (it) and the opposition, can the bargaining mode
be implemented effectively. This is possible because it utilizes many
of the motivational factors of each of the others extreme modes. Since
harmony and full cooperation between forces is generally the organi-
zation's stated objective, bargaining should be viewed and used by both
parties as an introductory method by which an on-going system of
o
collaboration is to be achieved.
The first item on the bargaining agenda should be agreement to
release information heretofore private to both sides. Item by item,
such information is exchanged until a degree of power parity has been
reached. The conflict energy thereby generated becomes the collaborative
problem-solving resource of the organization.
Figure 1 on the next page illustrates the relationship between
the three strategies. Note especially, the distance between power and
collaboration, and the use of bargaining as a half-way strategy between
the two:
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FIGURE 1: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STRATEGIES
Collaboration
- a theory and method for managing conflict
- achieve common solutions to which there is
commitment
- open use of information
- use of 3rd party facilitator
- use conflict energy creatively for win/win




a theory and method for managing conflict
achieve common solutions











use of 3rd party authority persons to decide
outcomes
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FORMULATING A CONTINGENCY THEORY OR - WHEN TO USE WHICH. .
.
The determination of when to use which approach - or which
combination - depends on a diagnosis of the causes of the conflict
and the presence or absence of certain preconditions.
DIAGNOSIS
A rule of thumb in contingency theory is that the prescription
is only made after a careful diagnosis of the problem. The CM
has to determine whether the causes are personal, interpersonal,
intergroup, environmental, or a combination thereof.
When individual stress mounts and influences an employee's
work and relationships in the enterprise, it is an organizational
conflict. Regardless of the origin of these personal tensions (they
may, for example, result from marital problems or psychological path-
ologies)
,
the CM has only a few tools for dealing with the situation.
He can engage in a one-to-one relationship with the employee and try
through counseling and coaching to help manage the problem. He can
recommend personal therapy and hope that the problem will thereby be
resolved. He can, where possible, act on the organization in favor
of the individual (e.g. help to accommodate his values, try to adjust
both organization and individual expectations) . He can dismiss or
transfer the person.
Most personal problems are also interpersonal in complex organi-
zations, because people must interact on the job. Even individual
issues become interpersonal conflicts when an unhappy employee comes
into contact with his work group. Interpersonal disputes are more easily
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managed when the CM is able to act skillfully as a third party
facilitator; when the organization is willing to spend time and money
to engage in team building and problem solving activities; when the
various task roles are well-designed or structured; and when the
parties can openly negotiate with themselves and the system for their
mutual self-interests.
Intergroup disputes increase the complexity of the conflicts in
the organization but are still manageable. Here the CM must develop
techniques for either getting the groups openly to explore their mutual
benefits and to problem-solve their differences or to negotiate a more
formal contract of resolution. Another alternative is to try to design
an organization where units interact as little as possible and each is
able to maximize its own self-interest. For the reasons mentioned above,




For some years, organizational theorists have been aware of the
impact of the external environment on the organization. Indeed, human
enterprises are labelled "open systems" to connote the permeability of
their boundaries with events and inputs from their environment. The
organizational system must carry on a responsive exchange with its
external environment or it simply ceases to exist.
Related to the above, a fourth category of organizational conflicts
can exist between competing organizations experiencing conflicting self-
interests. Sometimes these competing systems are external to the organi-
zation and sometimes they are internal subsystems acting as if they were
external organizations (e.g. unions). In every case, these competing
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organizations want to take from the system with which they are in
conflict, economic resources, legitimate authority, popular support,
the symbols of power, and other resources that are scarce and are
valued by the organization.
The tools for resolving interorganizational and environmentally
imposed disputes are at best primitive. However, bargaining and
power strategies are more likely to be effective in these situations
than the collaborative approach. This is due to the lack of common
authority structure, the competition for scarce resources and the
difficulty associated with perceiving mutual interests (it is hard
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to trust a confederation of separate entities)
.
One form of environmental pressure that has lately gained in
importance and against which the CM must use his most persuasive powers
and, to a lesser extent, his bargaining tactics, is the profligation of
revolutionary and adversary groups. The people associated with these
groups exist to scrutinize and question not only the actions of the
enterprise but, sometimes, challenge its actual existence. Collaboration
is not likely to be an effective strategy here because, as Oppenheimer
says in discussing revolutionary movements,
"....hence any opposition must be total opposition,
prepared for prison, exile, and hopefully, ultimate
revolution ... the symbol 'compromise' enjoys a bad
reputation almost on a par with 'opportunism.' Com-
promisers are therefore perceived as betrayers . When
independence or liberation is achieved, the moderates
are dealt with; objectively, they had sided with the
enemy. "13
Most of these environmental forces rely on public support for
their attacks against the system. Thus, the more the radical organi
16.
zation can do to assure its public legitimacy, the better it is for
the group. Figure 2 below summarizes these systemic levels of organi
zational conflict.
























Diagnosis of the causes of conflict is related to assessing
whether or not the conditions for using any one approach do, in fact,
exist. The major requisites for using the three different conflict
management approaches are stated below. They are listed according
to the author's interpretations of what constitutes the most to the
least criterion. Thus, under Collaboration, the most important pre-
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condition is required interdependence. Resolving substantive issues
is the prime function of Bargaining. Power-tactics may work well when
the power is in the hands of legitimate authority.
COLLABORATION
Collaboration is best employed when a combination of factors
exist which assures the method some reasonable degree of success.
There are four major prerequisites for using collaboration. In
order of importance they are: required interdependence, power
parity, evident mutual interest and organizational support.
Let us examine them separately:
Required Interdependence
This refers to the requirement for persons and groups in
the enterprise to collaborate in order to accomplish the task.
Some attribute the source of this requirement to the external
environment because the nature of the tasks depends on the product
which, in turn, is dependent on both environmental inputs and
environmental demands.
To surface disagreements and work them through requires
a considerable commitment of time, energy and emotions. It is
questionable whether people will (or should) invest themselves
to manage a dispute that is not compelling. People should be
required to manage their differences openly only when they cannot
accomplish the work.
Power Parity
Interdependence between individual groups , departments
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or factions is more than simply acting a role to accomplish a task
and reach an objective. It is also having a real and equal stake
in the outcome, and due to this, sense no constraints in the
collaborative relationship to interact frankly, even to deal firmly
with conflict when necessary. A kind of power parity must exist
wherein the parties are neither dependent nor counter- dependent.
Rather, they should feel free to interact and use all their resources
to further the total organizational objectives. While the parties
may recognize that they hold different rank in the organization, if
they cannot put aside status and authority differences in order to
work together for the common objective, then, by definition, there
cannot be true collaboration on work.
In many instances, the power parity involved in collaborating
will vary directly according to the compelling nature of the task.
When the task is demanding (e.g. a short-term crisis of extremely
important consequence for the organization)
,
people will want to
work voluntarily at full capacity, without being "hung up" about
power relationships, for the good of the enterprise. Other times,
it may be necessary to group persons at the same level of the
hierarchy (peers) to get the task accomplished. Or, some of these
dysfunctional vertical authority relationships may have to be
resolved for productivity to exist.
Evident Mutual Interest
The person or group in conflict must experience a "felt" need
that leads him/it to want to work on the disagreement. This is
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related to the two requisites cited above. But in addition to a
compelling organizational reason and feeling enough parity to be
able to collaborate, the parties themselves must be motivated.
Ther motivation often depends on whether the mutual gains are
self-evident.
The common goals, positive feelings and possible benefits that
could accrue from such a process need to be elaborated. A third
party facilitator to the dispute, because he is not involved directly,
may be able to help uncover and clarify the mutual incentives. Or,
the relationship itself may have to be tested and evolve (e.g. in
terms of building trust) before such open conflict management behavior
is possible.
Organizational Support
When there is required interdependence, power parity and a
"felt" need (evident mutual interest) provoking the will to engage
in the process, then the fourth prerequisite comes into play. It is
the extent to which there is organizational support for such behavior.
Unless complex organizations can actually store up some energy
beyond simply existing (homeostasis), they will not be able to engage
in organizational improvement programs. They will assume a management
-
by-crisis mode and their goal will be restricted to mere survival.
There must exist other- directed excess energy to engage in conflict
management programs,.
If, however, the organization can be made to recognize that its
long-term survival depends on planning changes for improvements, it
will realize the importance of giving support to such efforts. One
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way to prevent crisis -management is to defuse the incipient crises
by working them through while they are still conflicts. Moreover,
using the energy of a conflict to arrive at a creative solution to
the problem will promote innovation and generate ingenious alternatives
to organizational dilemmas. Further, when felt tensions are made
public, information leading to bigger organizational problems may be
recognized. This feedback may lead to modification and improved
performance which, in turn, could lead to extra survival capital.
Using the collaborative strategy, considerable organizational
resources are needed to manage conflict effectively. Such a program
usually requires a commitment of time, money and energy. The organization
(including top executives) should engage in a collaborative mode,
system-wide, so that the norms, rewards and punishments of the enter-
prise will be changed to encourage such behavior. However, since most
people are unaccustomed to open disagreement, particularly with someone
of higher organization rank, assurance must be given that such behavior
will not draw reprisals.
To confront one another effectively, and to emerge with the
problem resolved also requires skills. Learning how to communicate
effectively, how to synchronize the process, when and how to use a
third party, how to engage in effective problem- solving, and how to
keep the tension level moderate for optimal results, requires skills
that can be taught. At the moment, many organizations undoubtedly
view such constructive openness as deviant. However, once they are
convinced of the long-term benefits to be gained through the inclusion
of conflict management programs, they should not hesitate to invest
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the time, money and energy to train and build the skills into the
organization that would manage conflicts through collaboration.
BARGAINING
Bargaining is a strategy that requires working together to
solve disputes. It is best used when the aforementioned requisites
necessary for collaboration are not present. It must be recognized
that a bargaining or compromising approach has significant disadvantages
It may result in leaving neither party fulfilled. Half-a-loaf may be
better than none, but not when the bargaining tactics are used merely
to take advantage of the other side: using given information for
strategic counter-purposes rather than productive ones; withholding
information; bluffing and threatening; insisting upon strict adherence
to the terms and conditions of existing oral or written agreements
although they might be counter-productive to the organization; and
the imposition of sanctions for violations of same. Bargains arrived
at under such conditions establish a wary and resentful climate which,
when the quasi -agreement is signed and operative, can sharpen into
personal feuds, which in turn can spread into an all-out power struggle
between the factions. Inevitably, such a quasi -agreement must prove
dysfunctional for solving emerging problems; and outside the framework
of the bargained agreement it must foster growing attitudes of mistrust
and deletorious stratagems.
Another disadvantage is that the terms and conditions of legalistic
solutions (contracts) are often rigidly limited to a fixed date for the
next round of negotiations. Thus, they generally do not provide for
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adaptiveness and flexibility according to environmental demands or for
following opportunities for creative and proactive management. Finally,
when the goal of "beating the other side" becomes more important than
the organizational objective of creating a smooth running team to
enhance and improve the organization's working atmosphere and modalities,
the bargaining process becomes only a tool reinforcing the counter-
productive erosive process of the power struggle.
However, in a deadlock or revolt situation, where the organization's
productivity is affected and its survival threatened, the power player,
who has overplayed his hand, has two options: chancing imminent total
take-over by a third party authoritarian, in which event he risks losing
all power and possibly his job; or, opting to submit the issues to
bargaining. Bargaining is only meaningful to the organization, however,
when the issues are limited to the substantive so that agreements can be
reached that result in power parity. Once this balance is attained, the
stage is set for dynamic conflict management which can then move the
parties strategically toward a collaborative mode.
Substantive Issues
No matter how good the conflict management procedure is or how
much the parties want to collaborate, they may remain in dispute over
some issue, such as salaries, or which method is best to accomplish an
objective, even over a philosophic difference. Oftimes these issues
lay outside the control of either party and are simply due to some
environmental condition: a recession, for example, leads to times of
scarcity and salaries must be held at a certain level or cut back; a
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work procedure or a safety measure about which both sides feel strongly
but about which each must respect the other side's position. In such
a case, they agree to disagree because in good conscience they cannot
abandon their own arguments and they concur at least to search for
and be receptive to some way to resolve the problem that will be
mutually acceptable.
It should be possible to problem-solve most organizational
conflicts by attempting to find creative new alternatives that will
help both parties. However, this is not always successful, even when
there are good intentions on both sides . Bargaining is a method
designed to help resolve substantive issues. A "breakthrough" is
encouraged, by compromising, when the parties in dispute are bogged
down. Bargaining forces a solution through binding arbitration (albeit
a decision) that may not be entirely satisfactory to either party)
.
The emphasis in bargaining is to solve the substantive problem. All
other considerations such as being conscious of the relationship, the
procedure, the climate and other related dimensions to the problem that
may distract from the substantive issue must be set aside.
Gaining Power Parity
Sometimes the required interdependence between individuals or
factions is not great enough to make collaboration compelling or
advisable. The climate, hierarchical relationships and norms of the
enterprise may not support confrontive, problem- solving behavior: a
person who confronts his boss with a valid criticism may be punished
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later; a person exposing his differences to the opposition could
divulge information that would later be used against him. An
intelligent approach for the individual (s) who does not feel
enough equality or leverage in the relationship would be to test
his influence with minor suggestions ; if he sees they are accepted
graciously, it would indicate the other (s) is ready to work together
effectively and without reprisals.
Bargaining, as indicated, is a method for winning power parity.
Just getting into trading position assumes some equality, as each
side recognizes that the other has something of value to offer and/or
withhold that which is needed or can be used by the other. The actual
act of trading and compromising highlights the felt or assumed strength
and the influence of each party within the organization. In this
process, the power position of each side is clearly defined in direct
ratio to the information it reveals to the other, the concessions it
makes, the punishment or penalties it can impose.
Lack of Organizational Support
Bargaining does not require highly developed conflict management
machinery to function. That is, the organization does not have to
build the infrastructure of a supportive climate, skill building, norms
of openness and confrontation and interpersonal trust that are essential
to make the collaborative approach successful. Such machinery usually
develops later when the bargaining process stabilizes through achieve-
ment of power parity. However, for one group to organize and marshall
its grievances in order to make demands of another and then force
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interaction to come to a decision, is straight- forward and easily
begun if the grievances are backed by any degree of power. Therefore,
when the conflict management machinery is not well-developed but some
coalition is possible around issues to gain power parity, the Bargaining
mode is most useful.
Moving Towards Collaboration
It must be reiterated that Bargaining is a bridge between the
Power mode and the Collaborative mode. It is a lever by which to move
a system towards Collaboration. Ironically, in the event that a
majority (or the power faction) of the system's membership is reluctant
to accept the importance of collaborative problem- solving (such as the
granting of power parity relationships, fostering new norms, etc.), a
meaningful threat by the ant i -power faction to unleash all of its own
power arsenal in a win- lose struggle often turns the situation around,
cementing once and for all a power parity relationship between the
factions. Once a bargaining mode has been established and power parity
therefrom has gained equal recognition of rights, needs and the "good
faith" and trust potential of the opposing factions, and these, as well
as the interpersonal dynamics, have been tested and proven, the conflict
management machinery can be fully implemented.
In some industries and organizations where the bargaining mode is
the established method for settling differences, opposing factions have
been utilizing informal arbitration rather than the hard "give and take"
procedures of formal bargaining sessions. The savings in time, energy,
money and emotions reflected in the organization's goal achievements
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results in most instances in a willingness on both sides to set up
conflict management machinery to handle not only issues in conflict,
but to seek out and detect sources of potential conflict which can be
collaboratively problem- solved before they become dynamic issues.
Some of the older union-management relationships , such as the
steel industry, for example, have established enough parity and trust
so that they are using informal arbitration and pre-problem solving
on a continuing basis; thus, they are evolving from a bargaining mode
to the collaborative mode.
POWER
A power strategy to manage organizational conflicts depends on
certain environmental, intraorganizational and personal preconditions;
also whether an individual has his own or an organizational perspective.
Power is basically different from the other two strategies in that a
mutually acceptable solution to a problem is not the intended nor
expected outcome. Rather, the power person(s) tries to exercise as
much control over others (for the good of themselves or their organi-
zational interest) as possible.
Before we list the preconditions, let us examine the three major
sides to power dynamics in an organization:
Formal Authority (referred to earlier as "third-party authority")
.
This dimension of power is effecti\e to the extent that it is legitimate
and is believed. It backs up its authority with sanctions for non-
compliance. However, scholars since Barnard have raised serious questions
about the effectiveness of authority for exercising control over
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others. Crozier also points out that it is difficult ever to
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legislate behavior so closely that the individual still lacks a lot
of discretion about his compliant behavior.
Informal Influence is another aspect of power that may come from
one's personal leadership style, one's expertise, one's ability to
manipulate and persuade, or one's access to informal sources for
coercion (e.g. blackmail, physical force, outside -the -organization
normative pressures) . Not everyone in authority has influence because
it is an informal source of power. However, some persons in authority
are also able to use their offices and other resources to acquire
influence. This makes for a powerful combination.
Autonomy is the third dimension to the power triangle . . . the
ability to resist formal authority and informal influence in favor of
one's own self-interest. Being autonomous allows one to be his own
man, to control others by exercising complete control over self.
Using a power strategy may be most appropriate when the conditions
listed below are present:
Under Conditions of Legitimate Authority
When the authority of an office is accepted by the subordinates
as having a right to exercise control, the mechanism may work well to
mandate the management of conflict. For example, this may be a model
that will work for certain religious organizations, where authority
is inspired, or for the military, where those in authority have the
ability to put someone in jail or to dismiss him from the organization
for not following orders. Authorities who are so endowed, and especially
where they also have influence, could redesign the rules for managing
conflicts, could command individuals to suppress their feelings or
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could coerce parties into using the collaborative format. These
persons are able to design various strategies without giving as much
attention to compliance.
Under Conditions of Autonomy
Perhaps just as rarely as the above but still, in some instances,
a person may, in fact, be quite autonomous within the organization.
Some university professors or scientists (or other professionals) may
fit into this category. If few people can command or influence them
with any consequence, then they may want to use their resistant powers
to preserve their independence. However, if they should try to influence
others also, they are bound to lose some of their autonomy because, by so
doing, they extend rather than retreat.
To Cope with Crisis or Routine
Where the organizational environment is so stable as to create
internal conditions of routine, then the authority structure and the
procedures and norms can become rather rout ini zed (via rules and job
descriptions, for example). This can lead to excessive control: employees
using power tactics to make themselves heard vis-a-vis rather "heavy
handed" boses; or to subvert and manipulate undesirable practices.
Where the environment is so turbulent that it threatens the very
survival of the organization, the top echelon administrators may manage
by crisis. In times of crises, those in authority tend to assume
emergency powers. They may react even more aggressively and oppressively
towards others because they themselves are threatened. Subordinates in
the organization will probably decide between giving them emergency power
for the good of all concerned or using power tactics to actively resist
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them. If management -by -crisis becomes a predominant style, power struggles
will almost certainly be employed.
External Threats
When some external force seeks to destroy for whatever reason, it is
best to combat the aggressor by using power tactics. Such organizations,
as mentioned above, often lack the incentive for or are philosophically
opposed to collaboration. They may bargain if there is something to exchange,
In most cases, however, detente will be achieved through a balance of
power strategy.
A Desire or Need to Use Power
Power is a possible alternative when it becomes clear that winning
is imminent. For some, it may seem imperative to "win" on a certain issue
for a number of perfectly sound reasons, some of them thought to be in the
organization's long-term interest. Others just want to win for personal
reasons. They say, why should a person bargain or collaborate if he is
clearly in a position to get his way, unless he is convinced it is somehow
more humane? The use of raw power is costly in the long-term, however,
because others easily coalesce to combat it, and it may alienate important
people who have been supportive. Consequently, although in the short-term
it may be the best strategy, it can have a negative residual effect.
Some people have personality traits, non- organizational interests
and psychological needs that are best served by a power strategy. They
may crave independence, dislike interaction and fear supervision, in which
case they prefer autonomy or withdrawal. They may have basic needs,
derived from childhood experiences, that lead them to want to sabotage,
gossip and subvert those in authority. They might have strong needs to
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be "somebody" and have influence with others. Thus, they might opt
for a power setting in order to be more comfortable. Some might simply
be more skilled at politics and manipulation that at bargaining and
collaboration, so they choose what they do best.
Ideological Orientations
The newspapers are full of accounts of government employees who
leak valuable information to the press. The dimensions of the problem,
along with the values of the Youth Movement, are of great concern to
many top executives in regard to recruitment. Many employees are now
more loyal to their own moral code than they are to the principles and
objectives of the organization in case of a clash between practices and
values.
Some persons working in an enterprise may become convinced that
it or parts of it are corrupt or socially irresponsible. They seek to
destroy it from within. Others join with outside groups in causes that
are designed to overthrow the organization. Others may simply refuse
to participate if they believe a course of action or policy is "wrong."
No Perceived Alternatives
When a working participant feels desperate, he may turn to
power tactics for his own survival. In this situation, because
he feels threatened, he is very dangerous. In many organizational
settings there simply does not exist the underlying trust, sincere
intent, organizational support, power parity or required interdependence
to use the collaborative mode. Bargaining also is not possible
because the right issue and the right conditions are not present
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to permit it to take place. Thus, power is the only viable remaining
alternative.
Research tells us that if a person or a group is desperate to
be heard (e.g. the poor in the ghetto, some low- level participants in
a bureaucracy) or are extremely threatened, they are more likely to be
aggressive and hostile. Where there is little to lose, people might
also opt for the extreme forms of power strategy. Thus, desperation
forces persons to use this mode - and often, use it destructively.
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
For managers, settling disputes is central to improving their
organizations. When a CM gets at the real reasons for the power
dynamics in the enterprise, he can often discover some basic motivators
of human behavior (e.g. self-interests). Since the power strategy,
and to some extent bargaining, operate at a level of manipulating and
hoarding scarce information, diagnosing the nature of certain conflicts
is analogous to getting at the heart of the matter.
Unfortunately, many organization developers have pushed collaboration
to such an extent as the "best approach" - even when it didn't "fit" the
situation - that they have ignored the organizational realities of the
worlds of power and bargaining. The Contingency Theory articulated herein
takes a strong normative position, but attempts to match it to reality.
It is bound to help make better diagnoses of a given situation and
ultimately, be more effective. Beginning where the disputants are, the
developers using the theory will find that they can really work through
the conflict in a manner which is both realistic yet improvement -oriented.
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For example, the author has been engaged in two conflict management
efforts which illustrate this "fit." The first one was an attempt to
force people in a power- oriented big city school bureaucracy to use
the collaborative approach because, according to our understanding at
the time, it was the "best" way to manage differences. The technology
was powerful and compelling, and several people surfaced their disagree-
ments openly in order to set the stage for problem solving. However,
this open sharing of information later proved to be harmful to the
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participants. The readily given data were used against them.
In the second instance, an attempt to help an elementary school
faculty become more collaborative using a bargaining intervention proved to
besuccesful. Power parity was established between grade unit teams and
once this was accomplished, the people involved were better able to
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manage their conflicts through problem solving.
Organizational theorists and developers are becoming more realistic
about the appropriateness of three conflict management strategies, aware
that the use of each depends on the given situation. For example, the
National Training Laboratories, long the proponents of collaborative
values, now regularly supports laboratory education for power. All
three approaches are perceived by members of the enterprise as viable
alternatives for a given situation or in a particular organizational
setting. The existence of the strategies should be acknowledged and they
should be used appropriately and systematically.
Moreover, it is assumed that all types of organizational conflicts
will occur quite naturally. Many of them will promote creative tensions
that lead to system improvement. Some power strategies will serve the
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individual and possibly the organization in a variety of ways without
really disrupting the organization itself. Only those disputes that
are proving dysfunctional should set the machinery in motion.
The importance of an accurate diagnosis of the conflict situation
cannot be overemphasized. A manager is not ready to intervene until
he has discerned the nature of the dispute and the major contingencies,
and he is able to formulate a Contingency Theory. A key to effect
conflict management is to act appropriately (using one of the three
strategies) by trying to move the conflict from where it stands to a
position which is more "healthy" for the organization.
The literature is full of examples of inappropriate interventions:
organization development consultants, for example, trying to move the
organization to a collaborative mode without the necessary preconditions
or without using bargaining as a transition step; executive who
frequently advocate collaboration but do not support it, do not provide
the conditions for it, and/or do not understand when and where to use
it.
The following step-model might prove useful as a diagnostic
procedure for conflict management to arrive at an operative Contingency
Theory.
FIGURE 3: INTERVENTION MODEL
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The conflict manager diagnoses and then attempts to use the most
preferred conflict management strategy. If the necessary conditions are
not present in combination to assure success, he retreats in order
to build them. For example, he may lead out with a bargaining strategy
and then be compelled to employ power tactics in order to provide the
preconditions for successful bargaining. During the power sessions,
he re-evaluates all of the existing conditions and then tries to move
the situation to the highest, most responsive order of intervention in
the interest of the organization which might very well be the bargaining
mode. In doing so, he is behaving realistically, because once he has
settled the existing crisis with power, he has the normative situation as
a guide to help manage the persons and factions toward a more collaborative
state, that is, if he can build in the preconditions that make this possible,
He opts for the collaborative state whenever feasible because of the
greater incentive values to the individuals in their relationships to
each other which, in turn, creates the non- survival excess energy so
important to an organization's growth. Yet, collaboration may, in fact,
be very difficult to attain because of its rather demanding precondition.
In summary, the manager must consider collaboration, bargaining,
and power as strategies to be used situationally for effective conflict
management. This empirical stance may help him to improve some of the
most important functions of organizational lixe , as well as growth of
the organization itself for which he becomes responsible.
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